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Selling Stories OR You Can’t Own
This
CULTURAL PROPERTY AS A FORM OF COLLATERAL
IN A SECURED TRANSACTION UNDER THE MODEL
TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT
Grant Christensen†
“Within 10 tribal business days after receiving a signed demand by the
debtor, a secured party having control of an investment account shall
send to the investment intermediary with which the investment account
is maintained a signed statement that releases the investment
intermediary from any further obligation to comply with instructions
originated by the secured party.”1

I.

TRIBES ARE DIFFERENT: AN INTRODUCTION

The world of finance is littered with a panoply of obscure,
even obtuse, verbiage.2 While understanding the complexities
† Assistant Professor, Charlotte School of Law (Assistant Professor, The
University of North Dakota School of Law beginning Fall 2015); J.D. Ohio State
University, LL.M. Arizona (Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy). Fulbright Scholar
during 2011-2012 school year. Former Appellate Judge Havasupai Nation. Academic
Friend of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples advising the
United Nations Office of the High Commission of Human Rights. Thanks to Charlotte
Law for supporting this project with a research stipend and to Susan Woodrow and the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for hosting the Tribal Courts and Secured
Transactions Law Working Group in 2013 from which the idea for this article directly
attributes its genesis. A further thanks to Melissa Tatum, Mary Guss, Beth Kobak,
Camille Davidson, Megan Annitto, Brian Clarke, Carolyn Dubay, Meredith Jeffries,
and Hilary Burgess for their comments and their support. An additional thank you to
Sydni Kallam who worked as my research assistant and who almost certainly knows
more about secured transactions and Indian Law now than she cares to. A final thanks
to Keenan Lee, Ilse Hagen, Jan Tore Lund, and Sandra Ingebrigtsen, without whom
completion of this article would have been impossible.
1 MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-205(b) (2005), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mtsta/mtsta_aug05_final.pdf.
2 Anthony J. Luppino, Minding More Than Our Own Business: Educating
Entrepreneurial Lawyers Through Law School-Business School Collaborations 30 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 151, 161 n.29 (2007) (noting that the language of finance is so
complex that it ought to be treated at times as a foreign language. “English-speaking
members of a particular profession may in fact communicate more clearly with non-
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and nuances of finance is not essential for a large swathe of the
American populace, governments have an obligation to both
create and wade through the morass of financial gobbledygook in
order to protect consumers while simultaneously encouraging
and promoting economic development.3 Tribal governments are
no different from their state or federal sisters, and are regular
players in finance4 as well as regulators of complex corporations
and financial industries.5 However, given the smaller populations6
and more limited resources of many tribes7 compared with state
and federal governments, which are supported by considerably
larger tax bases, there exists an ever-present need for working
groups and collaborative efforts to educate lawyers, judges, and
tribal leaders about financial regulation8 in Indian Country.9 For
English-speaking members of their profession from other cultures than they do with
English-speaking persons who are not part of the profession”).
3 In fact, in pursuit of this goal the government—inadvertently or
intentionally—creates much of the confusing and arcane language upon which finance
is based. See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking:
The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 168 (2005)
(“[T]he technicalities of the trade finance business link group members in a common,
arcane language that transcends nationality but is also relatively inaccessible to
outsiders . . . reinforc[ing] the insularity and club-like nature of the group itself.”).
4 Tribes are active participants in the bond market. See H. FABIAN RAMIREZ
ET AL., FITCH RATINGS: PUBLIC FINANCE, TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE BOND MARKET
(2004), available at http://www.nafoa.org/pdf/BondMarkets.pdf. For a comprehensive
discussion of how finance impacts tribes in the same way as states, see generally
TOWNSEND HYATT ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN TRIBAL FINANCE (2005),
available at http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Documents/246.pdf.
5 For a discussion of the multi-billion dollar scale of some tribal financial
enterprises such as casinos, see Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R. L. Rand, The Hand That’s
Been Dealt: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 20, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 413, 435-36 (2009).
6 Wenona T. Singel, Cultural Sovereignty and Transplanted Law: Tensions
in Indigenous Self-Rule, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 366-67 (2006) (describing the
difficulty of tribes enacting comprehensive legislative reform based upon their smaller
size than communities facing similar challenges).
7 Joanna M. Wagner, Improving Native American Access to Federal Funding
for Economic Development Through Partnerships with Rural Communities, 32 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 525 (2007-2008) (“Indian communities have things to gain from their
non-Indian neighbors. For instance, tribal resources tend to be more limited than state
resources; by pooling their resources and information with other communities, tribes
can maximize their own resources and limit their expenses.”).
8 Indian Country is a legal term of art codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2011)
and defining the scope of tribal jurisdiction. For a more thorough discussion of Indian
Country, see infra note 18.
9 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE AND COMMENTARY TO THE MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTION ACT 11 (2005)
(“The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ([NCCUSL]) and
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis was developed for three purposes: (1) to
assist tribal legislatures in their review, adaptation and enactment of the Act; (2) to
facilitate the use and understanding of the Act by tribal judges, legal counsel and
individuals promoting business development in Indian Country; and (3) to assist nontribal lenders and businesses in understanding the similarities and differences
between the Act and corresponding provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
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tribes, the lack of resources and the constraint of economies of
scale make it more difficult but ever more imperative to get
legislation relating to business and finance accurately implemented
and enforced to encourage economic development.10 The exegesis of
this article focuses on the peculiar needs that Indian tribes have in
adopting and implementing tribal law related to secured
transactions, and explicitly, a review of the applicability of the
Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act11 followed by a note of
caution regarding the scope of its implementation related to both
tribal cultural property and the core of tribal identity.
This caution is particularly warranted given the
unparalleled role that cultural property plays in tribal life.12 As
tribal finance develops in both breadth and complexity, the
various forms of property that inevitably undergird finance
become increasingly intertwined with tribal law at the heart of
disputes in tribal courts.13 No longer will arguments about the
ownership of real or cultural property be solely among tribal
members, as non-Indian parties are increasingly asserting
ownership interests.14 Cultural property is inherently, often
incalculably, valuable.15 As tribal finance develops, it needs to
account for the protection of sacred places, objects, and other
10 For a sense of the scope of the importance of finance to tribal communities,
consider the extensive set of federal programs that encourage tribal finance as a form
of economic development. See, e.g., Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13; 25 U.S.C. § 470
(describing loan programs authorized by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934);
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 506-10; Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of
1950, 25 U.S.C. § 631; Indian Finance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-53 (2012).
11 MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-205(b) (2005), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mtsta/mtsta_aug05_final.pdf.
12 For a thorough treatment of the importance of tribal cultural property to
tribal life, identity, and even survival, see Rebecca Tsosie, Native Nations and
Museums: Developing an Institutional Framework for Cultural Sovereignty, 45 TULSA
L. REV. 3, 8-10 (2009). For an excellent discussion of tribal identity as group identity
see Melissa L. Tatum, Group Identity: Changing the Outsider’s Perspective, 10 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 357 (2000).
13 For an excellent discussion of tribal courts and tribal court civil
jurisdiction, see generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil
Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779 (2014).
14 Some of these disputes have already reached the United States Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008)
(determining the extent of tribal regulatory jurisdiction to extend to the sale of land within
the outer bounds of an Indian reservation by a non-Indian owned bank to a non-Indian).
15 Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the “Cultural” and “Property”
Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1033, 1037-40
(1992-1993). For example, the Ahayu:da carved by the Bear clan of Zuni Pueblo (a federally
recognized Indian tribe located in New Mexico) have a market value based on their rarity
and the monetary value that collectors of art place on the pieces constructed. But such
“market value” ignores the significance of the items to both the artist who created it and the
greater value the Ahayu:da have in the preservation of Zuni Pueblo culture. The “true
value” of these cultural objects is indeed incalculable. Id.
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forms of cultural property and preemptively create regulations
that ensure their protection.16
One of the many mantras of Indian law is that “tribes are
different.”17 In “Indian Country”18 a child can have three legal
parents,19 endangered species can be hunted subject to potential
treaty rights and even international recognition of the right of
cultural subsistence,20 casinos can be built in states that would
otherwise prohibit casino gaming,21 a tribal government may
establish religion22 or abandon a republican form of government
16 Id. at 1045 (“[I]f cultural property is destroyed the source nations or
peoples, as well as the world heritage at large, are divested of valuable objects.
Destruction makes any question of allocation moot. Deterioration, vandalism, and
accidental damage also diminish the nation’s and the world’s cultural resources.”).
17 Virtually everything written on Indian law demonstrates how it operates
differently. For a comprehensive discussion of the differences, see FELIX COHEN, COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (LexisNexis 2012) (1941) [hereinafter COHEN’S
HANDBOOK]; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari
Process as a Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009); Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (2008).
18 Indian Country is a legal term of art defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2011). It
sets the metes and bounds of Indian regulatory and adjudicatory authority by broadly
defining on which lands federal and tribal governments, as opposed to states, are
presumptively assumed to have jurisdiction. Accordingly, in the context of the Model
Tribal Secured Transactions Act, each tribe only has authority to enforce the tribal
Article 9 over persons and property located within Indian Country.
19 Indian children are unique in that not only their two legally recognized parents
but also their tribe may enter the courtroom and assert parental rights over the children.
Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2012). For examples of a tribe exercising these
rights, see In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009); Phillip A.C. v. Cent. Council of the Tlingit
& Haida Tribes of Alaska, 149 P.3d 51 (Nev. 2006). For a discussion of the unique states of
tribes regarding Indian children under ICWA, see Heather Kendall-Miller, State of Alaska
v. Native Village of Tanana: Enhancing Tribal Power by Affirming Concurrent Tribal
Jurisdiction to Initiate ICWA-Defined Child Custody Proceedings, Both Inside and Outside
of Indian Country, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 217 (2011).
20 Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah
Indian Tribe Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 165, 230 (2000-2001) (making an
analogy between Alaska Natives whaling under a cultural subsistence quota and the
exercise by the Makah of a similar right: “[t]he bowhead situation, then, is precedent
for the United States supporting American Indians in protecting cultural rights and in
reviving cultural traditions even when they include the controversial issue of whaling
an endangered species”); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (holding
that while the Eagle Protection Act has explicitly abrogated the treaty guaranteed
right of Indians to hunt bald or golden eagles, the Endangered Species Act may not be
sufficiently clear in its language to abrogate other treaty guaranteed rights to take
endangered species); Conrad A. Fjetland, The Endangered Species Act and Indian
Treaty Rights: A Fresh Look, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 45 (1999).
21 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987)
(“This case also involves a state burden on tribal Indians in the context of their
dealings with non-Indians since the question is whether the State may prevent the
Tribes from making available high stakes bingo games to non-Indians coming from outside
the reservations . . . .We conclude that . . . [s]tate regulation would impermissibly infringe
on tribal government.”).
22 Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir.
1959) (holding that the First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion
does not apply in Indian Country).
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in favor of a monarchy or competing government structure,23
there is no right to a grand jury,24 and the tribe can prohibit the
ownership or sale of arms.25 In light of these differences it ought to
surprise no one that tribes are highly resistant to simply adopting
wholesale the laws, financial or otherwise, that are in use by
municipal, state, or local governments. The Uniform Commercial
Code, which has been widely adopted with minimal local variants
by the states,26 simply does not protect or contemplate the unique
status and needs of tribal governments or the more complex senses
of collective and community ownership of property that often

The First Amendment applies only to Congress. It limits the powers of Congress
to interfere with religious freedom or religious worship. It is made applicable to
the States only by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . But . . . Indian tribes are not
states. They have a status higher than that of states . . . . The Constitution is, of
course, the supreme law of the land, but it is nonetheless a part of the laws of the
United States.
Id.; Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D. N.M. 1954) (holding that an
Indian tribe could refuse burial rights to Protestant individuals because they were not
Catholic without offending the Constitutional rights of the individual or the
Constitution’s prohibition on the establishment of religion); see also Kristen A.
Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in American Indian
Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 396 (2012).
23 Jacobson v. Forest Cnty. Potawatomi Cmty., 389 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis.
1974) (“The Indian Civil Rights Act contains no requirement that tribes have a
republican form of government. Congress realized that the leadership of some tribes
rests entirely in the hands of a nonelected group of elders. Meanwhile, first amendment
protections were incorporated in the Indian Civil Rights Act in order to make tribal
government and culture responsive and open to change from within.” (first internal
citation omitted) (citing Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status
of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1363 (1969)).
24 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329 (1978) (“‘The case . . . depends
upon whether the powers of local government exercised by the [tribe] are Federal
powers created by and springing from the Constitution of the United States . . . or
whether they are local powers not created by the Constitution, although subject to its
general provisions and the paramount authority of Congress. The repeated
adjudications of this Court have long since answered the former question in the
negative.’” (quoting Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896))). Congress has subsequently
used its plenary power to extend parts of the Bill of Rights to tribes under the Indian
Civil Rights Act (25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.), the right to a grand jury isn’t one of them.
Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (2000) with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25 For a thorough discussion of the limitations on the right to bear arms in
Indian Country, see Professor Angela Riley’s remarkable survey of both history and
law of the interplay between the Second Amendment and Indians. Angela R. Riley,
Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675 (2012).
26 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13-14. (“Every state as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, have adopted the UCC, although most have modified
the various articles in some National respects to accommodate issues and needs
specific to their respective business, legal and cultural environments.”); Stephen Ian
McIntosh, Note, Priority Contests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Purposive Interpretation of a Statutory Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1986) (noting
that all common law states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code).
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permeate indigenous legal thought.27 Accordingly, with the tacit
approval of both tribal and federal governments, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws28 has actively
worked to produce a model commercial code for tribes and has
recently published the final version of Article 9: Secured
Transactions, referred to hereafter as the Model Tribal Secured
Transaction Act, the Model Act, or the MTA.
With 566 federally recognized tribes29 controlling tens of
millions of acres of real property in the United States30 and
billions of dollars in assets,31 the widespread consideration,
adoption, and implementation of the Model Act cannot come
quickly enough. While a handful of tribes have already adopted
it in whole or in part,32 hundreds more will consider whether to
adopt and how to implement the Model Tribal Secured
Transactions Act in the coming years—and tribal judges will be
forced to provide an interpretation of the act shortly thereafter.33
27 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 15 (“The third objective was to create a model tribal
commercial law that readily accommodates differing approaches to various issues and
situations addressed by the Act, recognizing that the legal, business and cultural
environments of tribes differ from region to region and from tribe to tribe.”).
28 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
been working to standardize laws among the states (and tribes) of the United States
since 1892. For more information about the National Conference, see U. L.
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
29 The U.S. Department of the Interior is required by Congress to annually
publish in the Federal Register a list of tribes entitled to receive benefits and services
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This annual publication serves as a list of all federally
recognized Indian tribes. The BIA’s most recent list was published in 2014 and contained
566 federally recognized tribes. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 79 Fed. Reg. 4748 (Jan. 29,
2014), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc006989.pdf.
The United States has formally recognized a 567th tribe (The Pamunkey Indian Tribe) on
July 2nd, 2015. The formal recognition was published in the federal registrar here:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-07-08/pdf/2015-16711.pdf.
30 The U.S. Department of Interior manages about 56 million acres of land for
Indian Tribes. Tribes own in fee additional lands over which tribal law may be properly
asserted. Jeffrey Crockett, The Department of Interior’s Final Rule Allots American
Indians More Freedom to Lease Land for Residential, Commercial, and Renewable
Energy Development in Order to Improve American Indians’ Economic Condition, 2 U.
BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 157, 157 (2013).
31 Marcia A. Zug, Dangerous Gamble: Child Support, Casino Dividends, and
the Fate of the Indian Family, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 738, 786 n.265 (2010) (noting
that tribal casino revenue alone exceeded $26 billion annually and is growing rapidly).
32 The Crow Nation was the first to adopt the MTA in 2006. Several scores of
tribes have adopted it since. See Crow Nation is First to Adopt Model Secured Transactions
Code, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (July 1, 2006), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=2264&;
Crow/Apsaalooke
Tribal
Secured
Transactions Act, CLB06-01 (2006), available at http://sos.mt.gov/Business/UCCTribal
Nations/Crow/assets/pdfs/CrowAct.pdf, for the actual language the Crow adopted.
33 Crow Nation is First to Adopt Model Secured Transactions Code, supra
note 32; Crow/Apsaalooke Tribal Secured Transactions Act, supra note 32. As tribes
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As with any model code, tribal governments need to be certain
they understand what they are enacting into law, and tribal
judges need to consider the structures and rules created by the
act as they relate to and are set against tribal culture and
custom when making enforcement decisions. The following
article attempts to make those decisions a little easier.
This article addresses just one part of one facet of tribal
concerns relating to the implementation of enforceable financial
regulations: the appropriateness of registering a security interest
in tribal cultural property. Part II explains why secured
transactions in Indian Country present unique questions of both
“property” and “ownership” to challenge the traditional way finance
has approached individual debt and community economic
development. Part III builds on this understanding to introduce the
Model Tribal Secured Transaction Act and urges the NCCUSL to
amend the model act to explicitly include a default rule excluding
cultural property from the category of property against which a
security interest may be vested. For tribes that have already
adopted the act, this article encourages immediate amendment. If
the NCCUSL refuses to amend the model act, then this article
cautions all tribes considering its adoption to think critically
about the potential impact it may have on the protection of
cultural property and accordingly consider amending the act prior
to adoption. For tribes that wish to deviate from such an absolute
categorization, Part IV will suggest that only a deliberative and
democratic process relying on broad community support should
overcome the presumption against vesting a security interest in
tribal cultural property. Part V will briefly provide evidence of
the cautionary tale of what could happen if tribes are not careful
with protecting their cultural property, and finally Part VI will
offer a succinct conclusion.

continue to adopt the MTA and security agreements are made under them, litigation
will commence when breach occurs. Questions of the interpretation and application of
the Model Act do not end with decisions in tribal court. Decisions of tribal courts are
ultimately appealable to the United States District Court in which the tribe is located,
but only after the parties develop a factual record in tribal court and exhaust tribal
remedies. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (“We
believe that examination should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court
itself . . . . Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to
explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide
other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further
judicial review.”).
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PROPERTY AS A BUNDLE OF STICKS: WHY SECURED
TRANSACTIONS NEED TO WORK DIFFERENTLY IN INDIAN
COUNTRY

For those without legal training, the concept of property
often appears simplistic to the point of abstraction. Americans
may distinguish between real and personal property,34 and
amongst personal property may even contemplate a difference
between tangible and intangible property,35 but for each type of
property the common misperception of property ownership is that
it is absolute. In other words, the owner of a thing is its absolute
owner and has complete control over its use including the right to
alienate or sell and the right to exclude others. In legal terms, it is
as if most people believe that ownership exists only in terms of
the fee simple absolute.36 In reality, American common law treats
each “property” as composed of a virtually endless “bundle of
sticks” such as the right to live upon, to build upon, to cross, to
fish from, to use, to extract or excavate, to fly over, etc.37 American
law students uniformly spend part of their first year parsing
these ownership interests to understand for each “property” who
owns what interest.
A secured transaction works by perfecting a security
interest in a piece or parcel of property—essentially altering the
ownership of the various bundles of sticks for the duration of the
security agreement. Complicated enough at the best of times, the
unique nature of tribally owned property inserts the ownership
34 “Real property” constitutes land and the encumbrances attached to it
(“Land and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that
may be severed without injury to the land”), while “personal property” is “[a]ny
movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real
property.” Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (10th ed. 2014).
35 “Tangible personal property” is that which is physical and can be
touched—like a car or a can of soup. Intangible personal property is ephemeral—like a
copyright or trademark from intellectual property or goodwill in the context of
business. “Corporeal personal property of any kind; personal property that can be seen,
weighed, measured, felt, touched, or in any other way perceived by the senses,
examples being furniture, cooking utensils, and books.” Id.
36 “Fee simple” is a concept of land ownership which gives the landowner
complete control over the ownership, sale, and transferability of real property. Id. at
733 (“An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law,
endures until the current holder dies without heirs.”).
37 For a thorough discussion and critique of this bundle of sticks analogy, see
Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 878-79
(2013) (“The first contribution of the bundle of rights image was that it brought
analytical clarity to the concept of property. It made clear that property is not a
monolithic aggregate of powers but a set of distinct entitlements . . . the elementary
rights of property are the right to possess, use, and transfer; the right to have law
protect both the fact of one’s possession and the physical condition of the thing; and the
powers of appointment and liens.”).
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interest of the federal government,38 a sovereign and therefore
preferential creditor,39 into many secured transactions in Indian
Country. This section explores the nuances of those interactions
to demonstrate how any law governing the ownership or transfer
of property in Indian Country needs to account for interests not
present in other transactions by first briefly introducing the
concept of a secured transaction and then articulating why the
law surrounding such transactions is more complicated in
Indian Country.
A.

The Basics of a Secured Transaction

In its simplest form, a secured transaction takes place
when a contract is made “between a secured party40 and a debtor41
that creates a security interest in the debtor’s designated property
in favor of the secured party.”42
38 The federal government has an interest whenever tribal land is at issue, as
it has a fee interest in most real property in Indian Country. Essentially, land cannot
be encumbered without the approval of the federal government. The origin of this
doctrine comes from the Supreme Court in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574
(1823) (“[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”). This interest of the United States
has manifested itself in many ways in American law, and was codified by the
Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012) (“No purchase, grant, lease, or other
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or
convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”).
39 A preferential creditor is one who takes first when the assets pledged
cannot cover the full liabilities owed by the debtor or secured by an asset. For a
discussion of the problems surrounding and defining the scope of secured creditors, as
well as authority that the government often holds a priority position, see generally
Jacob S. Ziegel, Preferences and Priorities in Insolvency Law: Is There a Solution?, 39
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 793 (1995).
40 The “‘Secured Party’ is the party to whom a security interest in collateral is
given under the terms of a security agreement.” Often thought of as the creditor (the
one who extends money), “[t]he term includes a cosignor and a buyer of accounts,
chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes.” NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’S ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 9, at 21.
41 “A debtor is typically the party that provides the collateral. The term
includes any party with an ownership or other non-lien interest in the collateral, such as
a joint tenant, or subsequent transferee of the collateral or of an interest in the collateral.
The debtor may or may not be the borrower[, as a] debtor includes a consignee as well as
a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment of intangibles or promissory notes.” Id. at 2122. There are two other classes of persons who may have an interest in a secured
transaction but do not immediately benefit from the perfecting of the security interest or
the loan of immediate financial assistance. An “obligor” or “secondary obligor” may allow
their property to be used as collateral by the debtor. Their status is also defined and
obligations spelled out in this section of the Model Act. Id. at 22.
42 Id. at 23. MTA § 9-106 contains a complete list of common definitions used
in the Act; the Commentary adds some additional information to the terms for clarity
and for general reference.
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A couple examples will help a secured transactions
neophyte grasp the basics of the interests involved. A executes a
security agreement to borrow $100,000 from B to finance the
purchase of greenacre. A is the debtor, having incurred a
$100,000 obligation under the terms of the security agreement.
B is the secured party, sometimes referred to as the secured
creditor. B will perfect a security interest in greenacre under the
security agreement. If A fails to pay B under the terms of the
agreement, then B can have greenacre sold to obtain the balance
A owes B on the security agreement.43
If the value of the secured property exceeds the balance
on the security agreement, the secured party is entitled to the
amount owed by the debtor under the security agreement, and
any excess value that is realized from the sale is returned to the
debtor. In the event that the value of the secured property is less
than the balance owed under the security agreement at the time
the secured party enforces its rights, the secured party can still
force the sale of the property with a perfected security interest.
The entire amount is kept by the secured party and credited
against what the debtor owes the secured party under the
security agreement. The secured party is still entitled to collect
the remaining balance from the debtor, but that obligation
becomes unsecured.
Secured transactions extend beyond the realm of financing
the purchase of real or personal property. For example: A owns a
fee simple interest in greenacre. A executes a security agreement
that perfects a security interest in greenacre in exchange for
borrowing $100,000 from B to pay for law school. If A fails to pay
B under the terms of the agreement, then B can have greenacre
sold to obtain the balance A owes B on the security agreement
even though the money borrowed was earmarked to pay for law
school instead of the purchase of real property.44
The property subject to a secured transaction does not
have to be land or a vehicle. A security agreement can be
perfected in any kind of property that has and is likely to retain
value, including artwork, insurance, intellectual property, stock,
antiquities, natural resources, jewelry, and more. If the
obligations under the security agreement aren’t met, the property
43 The enforcement of a security agreement is provided for in every
jurisdiction, but the method by which a secured party enforces their agreement varies
from one jurisdiction to another. The right to seize, sell, and/or reposses property is
defined by the local law of a jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 254 (1971).
44 See id.
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that is secured is transferred from its original owner to the
secured party. Movie rights, publication rights, and religious
artifacts have all been used as collateral in secured transactions.
The danger in Indian Country is that some critically important
piece of cultural property might be used and then called away,
lost to the tribe forever.
If the security agreement is not vested in any specific
property, but is instead secured by all of the general personal
property (real and tangible) of the debtor, the danger of the loss
of cultural property is magnified. A tribal member who cannot
pay his or her obligations under the agreement will likely have
few tangible personal property assets of value. Artifacts or
other cultural property that have been inherited or part of the
debtor’s family for generations may be among the most
valuable items remaining and thus the property most likely to
be lost upon default.
This is not to imply that a tribe should ban all such
transactions out of a misplaced fear of losing vitally important
cultural property. On the contrary, secured transactions have a
myriad of uses. For example, a secured transaction enables a
party with an idea for a new business or a project that will yield
an economic dividend, but without sufficient capital, to secure
financing for the business or project on better terms than an
ordinary bank loan. By pledging property against the loan (and
thus vesting a security interest in the property subject to a
security agreement) the secured party has minimized the risk of
losing its core capital by allowing the seizure of the property if the
debtor is unable to meet its obligations under the agreement.
Accordingly, many projects that would otherwise be impossible to
finance—either because the risk involved would make the interest
rate required to finance the project usurious or because financing
cannot be found at any rate of interest—can proceed using
financing in the form of a secured transaction.
B.

How Indian Country Complicates Secured Transactions

At first glance it may appear that secured transactions in
Indian Country would proceed exactly as they would in any other
jurisdiction of the United States—with state law prescribing the
process for perfecting a security interest and the consequences of
default for both the debtor and creditor.45 However, that
45 As previously discussed, the Uniform Commercial Code has been widely
adopted with minimal changes and so this process for both the securitization of rights
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understanding discounts the realities of Indian law and the
unique relationship Indian tribes possess in the United States.
The reality in Indian Country is almost infinitely more
complicated. First, secured transactions involving real property
often require the direct participation of the United States because
it is the sovereign that controls the fee title interest of much of the
land base in Indian Country.46 Second, aside from fee ownership,
Congress has enacted unique rules for the potential alienation of
lands in Indian Country.47 Third, if tribally owned property is at
issue and if the tribe or one of its entities is a party to the security
agreement, the secured party or parties must obtain a waiver of
sovereign immunity in order to make the security agreement
enforceable.48 Finally, while choice of law questions have been
made largely irrelevant49 by the adoption of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code,50 the discrepancies between the Model
Act and U.C.C. Article 9 will require courts to determine when
each applies. In other words, because the MTA and the U.C.C.
Article 9 are not identical, it needs to be clear to both the secured
party and the debtor which law governs their security agreement
at the time of its creation. This certainty will enable all parties, as
well as courts should the agreement find itself in the middle of
litigation, to clearly understand the mutual intent of the parties
at the time of the agreements and accordingly give each party the
benefit of its bargain.

and forced sale or transfer of ownership that occurs on default is now highly
standardized throughout the United States.
46 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 568-69, 587-88 (1823) (clarifying that
upon “discovery” by the U.S. Government, tribes lost a fee simple interest in land and
retained only “Indian title” which includes the right to use, occupy, and cross the land
but not the right to alienate it). For a critique of “discovery” and the western bias it
implicates, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., SAVAGE ANXIETIES: THE INVENTION OF
WESTERN CIVILIZATION (2012).
47 A number of congressionally enacted statutes complicate the vesting of a
security interest in real property in Indian Country. For examples, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 81,
85, 86 (2012) (detailing contracts with Indian tribes or Indians).
48 When the security agreement is with a tribe, or with an entity entitled to
assert tribal sovereign immunity, the security agreement may be unenforceable
because any suit to enforce it would essentially be nonjusticiable. See Kiowa Tribe of
Okla. v. Mfg. Tech. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (“Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on
contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and
whether they were made on or off a reservation. Congress has not abrogated this
immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the immunity governs this case.”).
49 While the choice of law question may be theoretically interesting, when all
states have adopted an identical law it doesn’t matter which state’s law is used for all
practical purposes.
50 U.C.C. art. 9. Choice of law is discussed specifically in §§ 9-301 to 9-307.
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1. Indian Title
To say that the ownership of land in Indian Country is
complicated is an understatement on the scale of equating the
Grand Canyon to a hole in the ground. Land can be held in trust
by the federal government51 or owned in fee52 by the tribe itself,
by a tribal member, by a non-member Indian, or by a nonIndian. It can be subject to fractionation53 with hundreds of
partial owners. The zoning of land becomes even more
complicated. For example, the Supreme Court has instructed that
while it is sometimes proper for Indian tribal governments to
possess the authority to zone non-Indian owned fee land on the
reservation,54 other times it is the state that has the sole authority
to zone even tribally owned land within the outer boundaries of
the reservation.55
51 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U. S. at 543. Chief Justice Marshall recognized
that while Indian tribes were the “rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just
claim to retain possession of it,” the United States owned the “ultimate title” of the land. Id.
at 574, 592, 603. When tribes negotiate and sign a treaty with the United States that gives
up the tribe’s interest in real property, the United States takes full ownership of the land
unless the treaty reserves or protects the interest of any other land owner.

By the treaties concluded between the United States and the Indian
nations, . . . the country comprehending the lands in controversy has been
ceded to the United States, without any reservation of their title . . . . Their
cession of the country, without a reservation of this land, affords a fair
presumption, that they considered it as of no validity. They ceded to the
United States this very property . . . and the attempt now made, is to set up
their title against that of the United States . . . the plaintiffs do not exhibit a
title which can be sustained in the Courts of the United States.
Id. at 593-94, 604-05.
52 The Dawes Act allotted millions of acres of land in Indian Country to
individual Indians and opened up remaining lands to non-Indian settlement in an illdevised attempt to assimilate Indians with non-Indian American society and culture.
As a result, the legacy of allotment has clouded the ownership of millions of acres in
Indian Country by dividing it among ever more parties.
53 Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 236-37 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 706-07 (1987). For a complete discussion of the problems posed by the
fractionation of land interests in Indian Country, see Anthony J. Franken, Dealing
with the Whip End of Someone Else’s Crazy: Individual-Based Approaches to Indian
Land Fractionation, 57 S.D. L. REV. 345 (2012); Chris Schwab, Case Note,
Constitutional Law—Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause—Escheat of Trust
Lands, 65 TENN. L. REV. 805 (1998).
54 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 431 (1989) (“Since the tribes’ protectable interest is one arising under federal law,
the Supremacy Clause requires state and local governments, including Yakima County
zoning authorities, to recognize and respect that interest in the course of their activities.”).
55 Id. at 430 (“The governing principle is that the tribe has no authority itself,
by way of tribal ordinance or actions in the tribal courts, to regulate the use of fee land.
The inquiry thus becomes whether, and to what extent, the tribe has a protectable
interest in what activities are taking place on fee land within the reservation and, if it
has such an interest, how it may be protected.”).
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Much of the land in Indian Country is held in trust by
the United States on behalf of the tribes.56 Due to the unique
history of Indian law, courts have concluded that upon contact
with European colonizers, tribes retained their “Indian title” to
the land but lost the right to alienate their lands to anyone but
the colonizing sovereign.57 By holding the land in trust for the
benefit of tribes, the United States federal government has a
property right in the land—the sole right to acquire it.58
The complexities of this land ownership mean that in the
vast majority of instances involving a security agreement where
a security interest is vested in real property, the United States is
also an interested party to the contract.59 Without the approval of
the federal government, the security interest cannot be perfected;60
accordingly, creditors are unwilling to help invest in Indian
Country.61 Any secured transaction using real property in Indian
56 More than 56 million acres of land are held in trust by the United States
on behalf of Indian tribes. Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
(Feb. 13, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm. An additional 44 million
are set aside for the benefit of Alaskan tribes. See Elizaveta Barrett Ristroph,
Traditional Cultural Districts: An Opportunity for Alaska Tribes to Protect Subsistence
Rights and Traditional Lands, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 211, 212 (2014) (noting that the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA) has set aside approximately 44 million
acres of land to be divided among Alaska Native Corporations (the entities in charge of
managing land for indigenous Alaska communities)).
57 See 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also United States ex. rel. Hualpai Indians v.
Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941) (“[T]he policy of the Federal Government
from the beginning [was] to respect the Indian right of occupancy, which could only be
interfered with or determined by the United States.” (quoting Cramer v. United States,
261 U.S. 219 (1923))).
58 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
59 For a discussion of the problems this creates and a strong argument for tribes
recapturing the absolute rights over land lost in prior centuries, see David D. Haddock and
Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur
Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 173, 185 (2004) (“Insofar as there is
good reason to think that many tribes were disadvantaged when they involuntarily yielded
sovereignty to the United States, it is plausible that they would be advantaged if they
recaptured it. State governments rarely provide anything in exchange for the limited
sovereignty they acquire over the tribes, so it is similarly plausible that the tribes would be
advantaged if they recaptured sovereignty from the states. But voluntary non-fraudulent
agreements are mutually beneficial ex ante.”).
60 Indian lands cannot be alienated without the consent of the Secretary of
the Interior. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).
61 This conclusion follows from the premises established earlier. Without a
waiver of sovereign immunity and the explicit right to recapture the loaned value through
the seizure and sale of property, the risk to a lender would be so large that either the
interest rate required to lend to the party would be usurious or the secured party would
become unwilling to lend at any rate of return. Accordingly, this significantly limits the
forms of economic development in Indian Country to either projects run by the tribe or
projects funded entirely in cash. Because this subset of projects is considerably less than
the larger set of all projects that are economically feasible on the reservation if the parties
had access to finance, tribal economic development suffers by definition. Because tribal
governments have an incentive to promote economic growth, and stand to gain
concomitantly from the jobs and tax revenue such growth generates, all parties have an
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Country thus requires more expensive and more time-intensive
due diligence on behalf of both parties. Note, as the next section
will discuss, it is not impossible to vest a security interest in real
property held in trust by the federal government for the benefit
of tribes—it simply becomes more difficult.62
The complications of using real property as a security
interest in order to complete a secured transaction make it ever
more likely that tribal members and even tribes themselves will
be tempted to use personal property as security for a loan or other
valuable consideration. Section III anticipates this instinct and
encourages tribes to take proactive measures to protect those
forms of tangible and intangible personal property that are most
important for tribal identity.63
2. Congressional Hurdles to Perfecting Secured
Transactions
As discussed above, the federal government holds most
real property in Indian Country in trust for the benefit of Indian
tribes.64 It makes no difference whether the land was purchased
by the United States for the tribe or was purchased by the tribe
and taken into trust by the federal government.65 Once the United
States holds the land in trust for the benefit of tribes, a bevy of
restrictions on its alienation, use, and encumbrance are attached
to the land,66 but the land is also removed from the administrative

incentive to work out the legal difficulties that stand in the way to the promotion of
secured transactions.
62 Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. Where the federal government
retains a fee interest in Indian lands any encumbrance upon those lands requires the
additional approval of the federal government. “Our Government has ever claimed the right,
and from a very early period its settled policy has been, to regulate and control the
alienation or other disposition by Indians, and especially by Indian nations or tribes, of their
lands.” Lease of Indian Lands for Grazing Purposes, 18 Op. Atty Gen. 235, 236 (1885); see
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell, 767 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2014) (reaffirming the broad
scope of § 177, the validity of the attorney general opinion, and that the Indian
Nonintercourse Act “applies to conveyances of less than complete divestment.”).
63 For a discussion of the role that tribal cultural property can play in creating
identity, see infra Part V, and Rebecca Tsosie, Native Nations and Museums: Developing
an Institutional Framework for Cultural Sovereignty, 45 TULSA L. REV. 3 (2009).
64 See supra note 51. See Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Johnson v.
M’Intosh and the nature of federal land ownership stemming from the original
European claims to title of lands in the newly discovered Americans. Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574-87 (1823).
65 United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938).
66 Id.
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or regulatory control of the state, including the state’s ability to
levy property, extraction, excise, and sales taxes.67
In recognition of the federal government’s special interest,
Congress has long made it federal policy that Indian lands cannot
be easily divested or encumbered.68 Congress has consistently
reaffirmed its intent to maintain this restraint on alienation.69
Most recently in 2000, Congress strengthened these protections
by passing legislation that voids any contract that “encumbers
Indian lands for a period of seven or more years” without meeting
a list of additional criteria and receiving approval from the
Secretary of the Interior.70
67 Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (“Indians stand in a special
relation to the federal government from which the states are excluded unless the Congress
has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a tax] immunity and allow states to treat
Indians as part of the general community.” (alteration in original) (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n
v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 613-14 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting))).
68 The Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. The Act expressly forbids
the “purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians” without the explicit approval of the
Secretary of Interior. See supra note 62.
69 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2011) (“Nothing in this section shall authorize the
alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in
trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States.”). This was also enacted as Public Law 83-280. Act of August 15,
1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (commonly referred to in Indian law circles in its
abbreviated form as PL-280). PL-280 granted states jurisdiction over certain lands in
Indian Country but expressly preserved the federal restraint on the alienation of title
of any of these Indian lands. Id.
70 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2012). For an example of how complex the approval process
is, consider the five factors the Secretary of Interior must take into account before
approving a contract with an Indian tribe for the provision of outside legal services:

The following factors are to be considered in determining whether funds
should be paid to provide private legal representation for a tribe.
(a) The merits of the legal position which the tribe asserts. Greater weight
will be given to those cases where the tribe’s legal argument is deemed
particularly meritorious than to those cases where the tribe’s position,
although not entirely without merit, may be relatively weak;
(b) The ability of the tribe to pay all or a part of its legal expenses out of its
own funds. A review of the tribe’s financial resources under this subsection
will include an examination of the tribe’s total expenditures to determine
whether its expenditures for other purposes comport with the asserted
importance of the case for which it seeks funds;
(c) Whether the question the tribe seeks to litigate is being litigated in
another case by another tribe;
(d) Whether, as a matter of strategy, the issues the tribe seeks to litigate
could be more satisfactorily resolved in another forum, in a different factual
context, or a different time; and
(e) Whether the issue should be litigated at all in preference to a legislative
or other solution.
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Congress’s restriction on the sale of tribal land may
even extend beyond land held in trust.71 Congress continues to
pass legislation stating,72 and the Justice Department regularly
argues,73 that the Nonintercourse Act, which prohibits the
alienation of Indian lands, applies whenever a tribe purchases
real property, even if the federal government has not taken the
land into trust. Their position has not always been adopted by
the courts.74
Due to the vested interests of the United States in Indian
lands, there are significant barriers to using real property as
security in a secured transaction. While the security agreement
may be able to proceed with the consent of the Secretary of
Interior, all parties need to ensure the agreement is enforceable if
breach occurs.75
3. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
A security agreement is essentially a contract between
parties—the creditor receiving a security interest in property in
exchange for the debtor receiving monetary remuneration or
other consideration.76 Each party to the agreement expects the
other will honor their commitment.77 Because of this expectation,
25 C.F.R. § 89.42 (2014).
71 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 15.06 (providing a comprehensive
discussion of the federal rules regarding alienation of land).
72 Id. § 15.06 n.63 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-204, 118 Stat. 546 (2004)
(“authorizing the sale of non-trust land by Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community”);
Pub. L. No. 101-630, 104 Stat. 4531 (1990) (authorizing the Rumsey Indian Rancheria to
sell land acquired a year before)).
73 Id. (citing the Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Cass Cnty. v.
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998)).
74 Id. § 15.06 n.64 (citing Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., 5 F.3d
1355, 1357-59 (9th Cir. 1993); Cass Cnty. Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land
in Highland Twp., 643 N.W.2d 685, 696 (N.D. 2002); Anderson & Middleton Lumber
Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1996)).
75 For a discussion of the importance of secured transactions to both secured
parties and debtors, tribes and lenders, see supra, note 61 and accompanying text.
76 Bruce A. Campbell, Contracts Jurisprudence and Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code: The Allowable Scope of Future Advance and All Obligations
Clauses in Commercial Security Agreements, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1014-15 (1986)
(“First, and above all, Article Nine is a paean to freedom of contract, private property,
and free enterprise. Abolishing old legal restrictions based on the type of collateral and
the form of the security instrument, the Code allows the debtor and creditor, in a single
agreement, to secure all the debtor’s legally enforceable obligations to the creditor with
virtually all of the debtor’s present and future assets.”).
77 Id. at 1015 (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-301-318). The primary secured creditor has
always been able to easily monitor whether the debtor is meeting the repayment
schedule (are they receiving repayment from the debtor according to the schedule and
terms spelled out in the agreement?). Article 9 makes it substantially easier than early
laws dealing with secured transactions for the primary secured creditor to also be
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often not enough attention is paid to the consequences of breach.
All parties to the security agreement should be aware of the role
that sovereign immunity may play in the potential enforcement
of this bargained-for exchange.78
Indian tribes have been self-governing and independent
since long before European powers extended their hegemony over
the Americas.79 As a legacy of this independence, American courts
have long recognized that tribal governments have inherent
powers of sovereignty, and retain the full rights of sovereignty
that have not been expressly removed by treaty or statute or have
not been implicitly divested as inconsistent with the status of
Indian tribes in modern America.80 This sovereignty includes the
ability to assert the justiciability defense of sovereign immunity in
order to prevent a court from considering the merits of a claim for
breach or issuing a judgment to enforce the security agreement.81
The common law notion of sovereign immunity, which is
connected to the ancient premise that one cannot sue the king,82
extends to tribes because that sovereignty has never been
certain that the value of his secured interest is preserved by moving the focus from the
debtor’s overall credit worthiness to only the value and title of the property in which
the security interest is vested.
78 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (“Tribes
enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or
commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation. Congress has
not abrogated this immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the immunity governs this
case.”); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515, slip op. at 18-19 (U.S.
May 27, 2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-515_jq2i.pdf
(“All that we said in Kiowa applies today, with yet one more thing: Congress has now
reflected on Kiowa and made an initial (though of course not irrevocable) decision to
retain that form of tribal immunity. Following Kiowa, Congress considered several bills to
substantially modify tribal immunity in the commercial context . . . . But instead of
adopting those reversals of Kiowa, Congress chose to enact a far more modest alternative
requiring tribes either to disclose or to waive their immunity in contracts needing the
Secretary of the Interior’s approval.”).
79 Bay Mills Indian Cmty., concurring slip op. at 2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“Long before the formation of the United States, Tribes ‘were self-governing sovereign
political communities.’” (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1978))); see also STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN
POLITICAL RESURGENCE 72-76 (1988).
80 Bay Mills Indian Cmty., slip op. at 5 (majority opinion) (“[Tribes] remain
‘separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution.’ Thus, unless and ‘until Congress
acts, the tribes retain’ their historic sovereign authority.” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978), and Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323)).
81 For the specific application of tribal sovereignty immunity to commercial
contracts ordinary governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, see Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751.
82 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“When the Constitution was
ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could not be sued
without consent in its own courts. . . . ‘[T]he law ascribes to the king the attribute of
sovereignty, or pre-eminence . . . . Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought
against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him.
For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power.’”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *234-35 (1765)).

2015]

SELLING STORIES

1237

divested by treaty or statute, nor is it inconsistent with the
modern status of tribes as nations capable of maintaining formal
diplomatic relations with the United States.83 That sovereignty is
manifest by a “government-to-government relationship”84 between
tribal nations and the United States which, in some ways, is
superior to the sovereignty maintained by the sister states of the
union. Because tribes have not been ratified by the Constitution,
Constitutional requirements like Equal Protection and Due
Process, which have long ago been extended to limit the actions of
states, are inapplicable upon Indian tribes unless Congress
explicitly extends them into Indian Country. 85
If tribes utilized sovereign immunity in a manner identical
to states, parties entering a security agreement in Indian Country
would not raise special concerns regarding the potential
enforceability of the security arrangement.86 This is true because
most states do not have a legally enforceable interest in most
property subject to a secured transaction and because states have
enacted limited waivers of their immunity to promote economic
activity.87 However, while the several states have expressly waived
sovereign immunity by statute88—thus ensuring that parties that
contract with them can recover at law if the state breaches its
obligations—tribal governments understandably have been less
willing to issue blanket waivers of their rights as a sovereign. This
reticence is not unexpected; centuries of duplicitous dealings by the
federal government against tribes have warranted the caution
with which most tribes proceed.89

83 Tribes possess “inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 122).
84 United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 210 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Federal
recognition of an Indian tribe is a formal political act that ‘permanently establishes a
government-to-government relationship between the United States and the recognized
tribe as a domestic dependent nation.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. 103-781, at 2 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted))). Congress has codified this relationship among
other recognition of the inherent sovereignty of tribes at 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
85 For an example based on an Equal Protection claim where the Supreme
Court held that the only way to enforce a violation was by habeas petition, and
therefore if the plaintiff was not physically confined, no remedy was available, even if
she had an otherwise valid complaint under the Equal Protection Clause, see Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
86 Some states have waived their sovereign immunity involving the breach of
a contract with private citizens willfully, others have been induced to do so by the
federal government. Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of
State Sovereign Immunity: The Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 439, 481-82 (2002).
87 Id.
88 See id. at 498.
89 See generally N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW (2008).

1238

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:4

Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity,90 if an entity
capable of asserting sovereign immunity is a party to the
security agreement, the agreement will only be truly enforceable
in court (whether federal, tribal or state) with the expressed
consent of the sovereign entity.91 While courts acknowledge that
tribal sovereign immunity may complicate both the enforcement
of agreements and the expectation of the parties, who are often
unaware that sovereign immunity is a potential defense to
enforcement, the Supreme Court correctly continues to reaffirm
that protecting sovereignty is more important than giving each
party to an agreement the benefit of their bargain.92 The issue of
sovereign immunity becomes ever more complicated in Indian
Country because not only could there be sovereign interests from
both federal and tribal governments that would require a
waiver, but certain types of tribal corporations can similarly
assert the tribe’s immunity.
Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
93
(IRA) after the federal government commissioned the Meriam
Report,94 an influential Congressional report documenting
widespread poverty and administrative mismanagement in Indian
Country. The IRA was intended to correct some of the identified
injustices that tribes had been forced to accept under previous
iterations of federal Indian policy by encouraging tribes to play a
more proactive role in their daily governance.95 Under the IRA,
90 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the power of tribes to waive sovereign
immunity and the lack of judicial alternatives for enforcement of agreements by private
parties when such a waiver is absent. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515, slip
op. at 1 (U.S. May 27, 2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12515_jq2i.pdf (“Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity from a State’s suit to
enjoin gaming off a reservation or other Indian lands. And we decline to revisit our prior
decisions holding that, absent such an abrogation (or a waiver), Indian tribes have
immunity even when a suit arises from off-reservation commercial activity.”).
91 Id. at 5-6.
92 Id. In addition to the Supreme Court’s discussion in Bay Mills, see also
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (articulating clearly
that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense to litigation unless it has been
explicitly waived).
93 25 U.S.C. § 461-79 (2012). Sometimes referred to as the Wheeler-Howard
Act, it was enacted June 18, 1934.
94 LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE
PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928). For a discussion of the report’s
importance to federal Indian law, see generally Christopher A. Karns, Note, County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation: State
Taxation as a Means of Diminishing the Tribal Land Base, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1213,
1234-35 (1992); Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating The Indian Termination Policy,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1199 (1983).
95 Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38
CONN. L. REV. 777, 787 (2006) (“In some respects, tribal self-determination as an
affirmative federal policy began in the 1930s during the New Deal era under the legal
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tribes were permitted to organize and adopt tribal constitutions to
assist with their governance.96
Section 17 of the IRA went further.97 It explicitly authorized
the Secretary of Interior to issue tribal corporate charters.98 The
corporations thus created were empowered to hold land, including
lands restricted from resale, and to conduct business for the
benefit of the tribe.99 A tribal corporation chartered under Section
17 must be wholly owned by the tribe itself.100 These corporations
do not have an active role in the tribe’s governance, but by virtue
of their ownership structure have been able to exercise a tribe’s
sovereign immunity in certain cases.101
The IRA goes even further in protecting the assets of
these corporations.102 A tribe maintains control over an IRA
corporation’s assets unless the tribal government intentionally
and explicitly transfers their control directly to the corporation.103
Even when contractual language exists permitting the IRA
corporation to “sue and be sued,”104 courts have held that only
assets specifically pledged or assigned are eligible to satisfy a
judgment, and that the general assets of the corporation cannot
be reached.105 This is a unique relationship found almost
auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The IRA preserved, empowered and
transformed modern tribal governments.”).
96 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (granting a tribe “the right to organize for its common
welfare, and [ ] adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws”); 25 U.S.C. § 476(e) (“In
addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal
council . . . rights and powers.”).
97 Id. § 477 (“The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by any tribe,
issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That such charter shall not
become operative until ratified by the governing body of such tribe. Such charter may
convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or
otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every description,
real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue
in exchange therefor interests in corporate property.”).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3 (2012) (laying out the tax benefits to single
member ownership).
101 For example, a Section 17 corporation can acquire an interest in allotments
and other lands where the United States is the ultimate fee title owner. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 476(e). Both tribal and potentially federal claims to sovereign immunity may apply to
any party attempting to alienate that land from the Section 17 corporation. The federal
government requires that any contract or other agreement which may alienate land
held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe be approved separately by the
Secretary of Interior. See id. § 81.
102 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at § 4.04[3][a][ii].
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 175 (Alaska 1977); Dixon v. Picopa
Construction Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ariz. 1989); White Mountain Apache Indian
Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654, 657 (Ariz. 1971).
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exclusively in the context of IRA tribes, where what looks in
almost every regard as a private, for-profit entity is in fact a
direct agent of the authority of the tribal government capable of
asserting that government’s immunity.
Accordingly, if a tribal corporation chartered under Section
17 of the IRA is a party to a security agreement, the property in
which the security interest is to be perfected needs to be pledged
in advance of whatever security it might require.106 This can take
several forms, including transferring the assets to a non-IRA
entity or establishing an escrow account to hold the property until
the security agreement has been completed.107 The overarching
takeaway from this discussion is that secured transactions are
bound to work differently in Indian Country because property
ownership works differently in Indian Country. As a consequence,
the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act is an excellent
starting point for both potential non-Indian secured parties and
tribal debtors to agree to terms that would enhance and promote
economic activity in Indian Country.
4. Choice of Law
Just because a secured transaction involves an Indian
individual or business, property located on a reservation, or an
Indian tribe that has adopted the Model Tribal Secured
Transaction Act, does not mean that the law governing the
transaction is automatically the Model Act. The question of choice
of law,108 which underlies any question in which the laws of
potentially more than one sovereign are interested,109 is as relevant
106 David B. Jordan, Federal Indian Law: Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Why
Oklahoma Businesses Should Revamp Legal Relationships with Indian Tribes After Kiowa
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing. Technologies, Inc., 52 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 512 (1999).
107 Id.
108 Most Americans, and unfortunately even many young lawyers, assume
that when you are in front of a court that it will automatically apply its own law. The
reality is considerably more complex. Each state, most frequently as a matter of
common law, has implemented a methodology for selecting which law applies in any
given dispute. Different methodologies yield different answers. For example, a question
of contract validity may be determined by the law of the place of the contract’s creation
while a dispute involving performance may be governed by the law of the state where
the contract was designed to be performed. Thus, a Massachusetts court may apply
Maine law. Indian tribes complicate these choice of law questions even further. For a
thorough discussion of the current choice of law rules for each jurisdiction, as well as a
concise explanation of the perils and pitfalls of conflict of laws generally, see Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual
Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217 (2013).
109 Id. This should be self-evident. For example, if only one state is involved
there would be no conflict of law question. Thus, if a Minnesota plaintiff brings suit
against a Minnesota defendant in a Minnesota court for an intentional tort that
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to litigation involving Indian tribes as to any other set of domestic
or foreign parties.110 However, the unique status of Indians as
“domestic dependent nations” with a sovereignty “co-equal to that
of states” raises some additional unique considerations.111 This
section briefly describes when the Model Tribal Secured
Transactions Act governs a dispute involving a security agreement
where the debtor, secured party, or property with a perfected
security interest exists within an Indian tribe’s jurisdiction. The
easiest situation involves when the parties explicitly agree via
contract to apply the Model Act. Absent that choice of law clause,
when security agreements are silent regarding choice of law,
tribal courts are likely to apply the Act in most instances while
state and federal forums will be slightly more equivocal.
The following discussion is naturally limited by the proper
assertion of jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the
defendant.112 The Model Act deals with a secured transaction that
manifests itself in a contractual context via the security agreement
and does not itself inherently raise a federal question,113 suggesting
that the proper venue for these disputes is in either tribal or state
occurred entirely in Minnesota, there is no question that Minnesota law applies and
thus no conflict of law.
110 Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law Principles
Should Apply to Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006) (“[T]he
Supreme Court, acting under the assumption that state and tribal forums will each apply
their own law, has devoted considerable attention to developing rules that determine
whether a case involving tribal contacts should be heard in tribal court or state court.”).
111 Early in its jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court determined
that Indian tribes were “states” but not “foreign states” and so occupied a heretofore
unknown status of “domestic dependent nations.” As a result of their status, the federal
government owes to tribes an obligation to hold and maintain tribal property. Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
It may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can with strict accuracy be
denominated foreign nations. They may more correctly perhaps be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which
we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases.
Id. at 2 (headnote). This idea was most recently reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474 n.3 (2003).
112 A judge does not reach the merits of a case without the proper power over
both the subject matter and the defendant. While the defendant has an obligation to
raise the issue that a court may lack personal jurisdiction, the Court itself has an
affirmative duty to ensure that it has the proper authority to hear the subject matter of
the case. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). The
importance of jurisdiction is reaffirmed often by the Supreme Court. See e.g., Vaden v.
Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009).
113 Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152-54. Mottley makes clear that questions of contract
law arise under state not federal law and accordingly do not qualify for federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
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court.114 As the ensuing discussion will suggest, a given forum’s
laws have a tremendous bearing on whether a court will apply the
Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act and should therefore be
considered prior to commencing litigation. As a general practice
note, it is better for all parties to be aware at the time of entering
into the security agreement what law will govern a dispute under
the agreement.115 Accordingly, all lawyers are encouraged to
utilize a “choice of law clause” to avoid both uncertainty and the
problems described in subsections B and C.
a. The Choice of Law Clause
Until comparatively recently, American courts were
sharply divided over the enforceability of a choice of law or choice
of forum clause that specified a foreign court or foreign law.116
While the Supreme Court has guaranteed to Indians the right to
“make their own laws and be governed by them,”117 often tribal
courts or the selection of tribal law have been deemed sufficiently
foreign to allow states to refuse to enforce the contractually
agreed upon terms mutually ratifying the choice of a tribal court
or tribal law.118
Jackie Gardina highlights119 just one example from New
Mexico. In Wacondo v. Concha,120 tribal members from Zia Pueblo
114 There are several ways in which a dispute which raises a question of state
or tribal instead of federal law can nonetheless be heard in federal court. The most
common of these is predicated upon diversity jurisdiction, which requires that no
plaintiff be from the same state as any defendant and that the amount in controversy
exceed a dollar amount set by statute, currently $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
115 For an excellent discussion of the potential pitfalls that may occur when all
parties to an agreement are unaware of what law may govern, see generally Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 2359, 2403-05 (1998).
116 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“Forum-selection
clauses have historically not been favored by American courts. Many courts, federal and
state, have declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were ‘contrary to
public policy,’ or that their effect was to ‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the court.”). The Supreme
Court just reaffirmed the enforceability of forum selection clauses during its 2013-2014
sitting. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. W. Dist. Tex., No. 12-929, slip op. at 1
(U.S. Dec. 3, 2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12929_olq2.pdf (“[A] forum-selection clause may be enforced by a motion to transfer under
§ 1404(a) which provides that ‘[f ]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all
parties have consented.’” (internal citation omitted)).
117 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
118 Danka Funding Co. v. Sky City Casino, 747 A.2d 837, 841, 844 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1999) (denying the applicability of a choice of law clause in a contract
with a tribal casino operation).
119 Jackie Gardina, Federal Preemption: A Roadmap for the Application of
Tribal Law in State Courts, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2010-2011).
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and Jemez Pueblo brought suit against a member of Taos Pueblo
for a shooting that occurred in Jemez Pueblo.121 The New Mexico
court concluded that there was no barrier to applying New Mexico
law.122 If state courts remain similarly cavalier regarding the
Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act, then it will remain of
limited practical use because a party who wants to take advantage
of the U.C.C. instead of the MTA will simply seek to enforce their
rights in state court, undercutting both the intent of the parties
and the enforceability of the model code. Such “forum shopping”
would also jeopardize a tribe’s ability to protect its cultural
property through laws like the MTA because there is no
concordant limitation on vesting a security interest in tribal
cultural property under most state or federal laws. Accordingly,
both the tribal law and the general practice of resolving conflict of
laws between tribal and state courts need to recognize the
overriding importance of the protection of tribal cultural property.
As Professor Christine Zuni Cruz notes:
The process of incorporating customary law into a formal legal
system will not be easy and will take the work of the judiciary, the
litigants, and the tribe. If an active approach is not taken to support
customary law, customary law will give way to other influences, such
as state and federal law devoid of indigenous thought.123

The stakes for tribal choice of law are high. Ignoring tribal
law in this way raises barriers to the development of a
comprehensive tribal law based on the customary legal principles
unique to each tribe, and deprives all parties from incorporating
indigenous thought into the broader panoply of American law.124
Inversely, the widespread adoption of forum selection and choice
of law clauses that bind all parties to an agreement and explicitly
rely upon tribal forums and tribal law to resolve disputes will help
considerably advance the legitimacy of indigenous legal thought.
Such widespread adoption of blended western/indigenous legal
principles, like the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Act, will
enshrine uniform tribal laws within the larger commercial and
legal context, creating a new space for the protection of tribal
873 P.2d 276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 277.
122 Id. at 277-78.
123 Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17,
27 (1997) (now Christine Zuni Cruz) (“Participation and interest of judges in
incorporating customary law is critical. If there is no interest or if there is resistance on
the part of the judiciary, incorporation of customary law and development of an
indigenous body of law unique to a particular tribe will be minimal.”).
124 See, e.g., Wacondo, 873 P.2d at 277-78.
120

121
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peoples and property that practitioners from both communities
can widely embrace.125
To clarify these potential conflicts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Bremen v. Zapata.126 In Zapata, an American
corporation specializing in offshore oil and gas drilling contracted
with a German company to tow one of its rigs from coastal
Louisiana to a new location in Italy’s Adriatic Sea.127 While the rig
was being moved, a storm off the coast of Florida damaged it
significantly enough that it was redirected to Tampa, Florida for
repairs.128 While the original contract agreement specified that
“[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of
Justice,”129 the Middle District of Florida,130 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals,131 and then the entire Fifth Circuit en banc132
refused to enforce the choice of forum clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.133 It recognized that
while “foreign businessmen prefer, as do we, to have disputes
resolved in their own courts, [ ] if that choice is not available”134
then limiting the forum for disputes to one mutually agreed upon
by the parties does not work an injustice.135 The Court was
influenced in part by the fact that the London Court of Justice
was generally perceived to be a fair tribunal with an expertise in
maritime law.136 It further recognized a number of limited
exceptions where enforcing the mutually agreed upon terms of a
See, e.g., id.
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 3.
129 Id. at 2.
130 In re Unterweser Reederei, 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
131 In re Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d 888, 895 (5th Cir. 1970) (“The district
court was entitled to consider that remanding Zapata to a foreign forum, with no
practical contact with the controversy, could raise a bar to recovery by a United States
citizen which its own convenient courts would not countenance.”).
132 In re Unterweser Reederei, 446 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1971) (the Fifth
Circuit, en banc, upheld the decision of the Fifth Circuit panel over a strong dissent by
6 of the court’s 15 members).
133 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8-9 (“We hold, with the six dissenting members of the
Court of Appeals, that far too little weight and effect were given to the forum clause in
resolving this controversy.”).
134 Id. at 11-12.
135 Id. at 17-18 (“Whatever ‘inconvenience’ Zapata would suffer by being forced
to litigate in the contractual forum as it agreed to do was clearly foreseeable at the
time of contracting. In such circumstances it should be incumbent on the party seeking
to escape his contract to show that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely
difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day
in court. Absent that, there is no basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or
unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain.”).
136 Id. at 11-12 (“Plainly, the courts of England meet the standards of
neutrality and long experience in admiralty litigation.”).
125
126
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contract may prove problematic: fraud,137 undue influence,138 and
unequal bargaining power.139
The logic of Zapata has since been applied to contractual
choice of law and choice of forum clauses in Indian Country.140
Therefore, the easiest way to ensure whether U.C.C. § 9 or the
Model Tribal Secured Transaction Act will govern any given
security agreement would be to clearly choose the law and the
forum in the agreement itself.
However, as in many other areas of law, all parties
should be aware of the other relevant tribal laws and the public
policy of the forum, which may be used under rare
circumstances to frustrate a choice of law clause between
contracting parties.141 Moreover, the parties should consider the
exigencies involved with the enforcement of a judgment obtained
under a security agreement in Indian Country.142 Remedies
generally available in the state may be unavailable or
significantly altered on the reservation.143
b. In Front of a Tribal Court
If the security agreement is silent on choice of law, then
the laws of the forum regarding choice of law govern both the

137 Id. at 15 (“The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum
clause specifically unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud.”).
138 Id. at 12-14.
139 Id. There was no unequal bargaining power on these facts because there
were multiple companies bidding for the towage contract. Id. at 12 n.14.
140 Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 32 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 505 (D. R.I. 1999) (“Therefore, an American Indian court system that is
different from the American federal model cannot cause avoidance of either an
arbitration or forum selection agreement as unreasonable.”). Ninigret was later vacated
and remanded for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, which has no bearing on the
enforceability of a forum selection clause. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian
Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 2000).
141 See Romano, supra note 115, at 2407 (“The conventional conflicts-of-law
objection to application of an internal-affairs-type doctrine to securities transactions,
which is captured by the public policy exception to choice-of-law clause enforcement
and to requirements that the chosen state have a reasonable connection to the
transaction or the parties, is that the investor’s domiciliary state has a more important
‘interest’ in a securities dispute than the issuer’s domicile.”).
142 See generally Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th
Cir. 1983) (allowing tribal law to limit the self-help remedies of car repossession on the
Navajo Reservation). “[T]he Tribe has the ‘power to place conditions on entry, on
continued presence, [and] on reservation conduct . . . ’[sic]Regulating the conduct of
non-Indians repossessing automobiles on reservation land is a valid exercise of the
Tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation.” Id. at 594 (quoting
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982)).
143 Id.
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procedural and substantive matters in front of the court.144 While
the Supremacy Clause ensures that neither states nor tribes may
act contrary to federal law,145 and the Commerce Clause explicitly
allows Congress to enact laws designed to regulate commerce
with Indian tribes,146 there is no federal law regarding all of the
nuances of a security agreement. Accordingly, tribal courts are
free to use their own rules for determining the choice of law that
governs civil disputes in tribal courts.
The Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act was designed
to recognize that tribal interests regarding secured transactions
differ from those proposed in U.C.C. Article 9, and to assist
tribes with the exercise of their sovereign rights over these kinds
of transactions.147 For tribal jurisdictions where the Model Act
has become part of the tribal code, tribal courts will endeavor to
adopt choice of law and conflict of law rules that permit them to
apply the Model Act as often as possible.148 Tribal courts are given
considerable leeway to decide which laws apply within their
jurisdiction. Accordingly, they will be loath to refuse to enforce the
Model Act over all possible transactions within their remit because
the Model Act represents the greatest possible compromise
between indigenous legal thought and traditional western concepts
of securitization and property rights.149 Therefore, most legal
144 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law,
98 IOWA L. REV. 1163 (2013).
145 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
146 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
147 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 14-15 (“The Committee also recognized that many provisions of
Article 9 were unlikely to be appropriate or relevant in Indian Country, at least in the
near future, and if included would add unneeded complexity to a tribal secured
transactions law.”).
148 The Supreme Court has openly expressed its fear that tribal courts will too
often seek to apply tribal law. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal
and Intratribal Common Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 701, 705, 709-11 (2006) (“Members of
the Supreme Court appear to have assumed that tribal courts apply a tribal common
law that is so far from Anglo-American common law as to be unrecognizable to nonIndians.”) (drawing support from dicta in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374-75 (2001),
and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
149 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 14-15. Tribal courts, like their state and federal counterparts, are
able to make determinations regarding which laws apply within their jurisdictional remit.
In jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Act, it is likely that tribal courts will work to
actively apply the Model Act (as opposed to U.C.C. Art. 9) to as many cases as possible

2015]

SELLING STORIES

1247

disputes involving secured transactions that end up before the
tribal court of a tribe that has adopted the Model Act are
exceedingly likely to see the act selected as the choice of law
governing the dispute.
c. In Front of a State or Federal Court
Litigating a security agreement involving tribal or Indianowned property creates the most uncertainty regarding choice of
law when the forum is a state or federal court. Each state has its
own choice of law rules,150 and has been given wide latitude by the
U.S. Supreme Court to adopt a method for resolving conflict of law
questions,151 subject to virtually no qualification except the broad
limits of the Due Process Clause.152 The results of the various
methods of state choice of law rules are impossible to predict in the
abstract, and will likely turn upon the facts of the dispute, the
status of the parties, and the language of the security agreement.153
For cases that get to federal court on the basis of
diversity,154 the Supreme Court has been consistently clear since
Erie155 that the federal court is to apply the substantive law
because it is both the law enacted by the legislative body to which the court is subject and
because it advances indigenous thought relating to property and contract rights.
150 Symeonides, supra note 108, at 279.
151 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (“It is not for this
Court to say whether the choice-of-law analysis suggested by Professor Leflar is to be
preferred or whether we would make the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Our sole function is to determine whether the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s choice of its own substantive law in this case exceeded federal
constitutional limitations.”).
152 Id. at 320. The modern Due Process Clause test to determine a
Constitutional violation in the choice of law context requires a state have “a significant
aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests,
such that application of its law was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Id.
153 Id. at 307-08.
154 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they need
permission in order to hear a case. The Constitution sets the baseline for this
permission in Article III, § 2:
The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different
States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
Congress has further limited the ability of federal courts to hear cases by statute. One
of the more common ways federal courts obtain jurisdiction over a case is through
diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases,
even arising under only state law causes of action, when there is complete diversity of
parties and the statutory threshold for the amount in controversy has been met.
155 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

1248

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:4

selected by the choice of law rules of the state in which the federal
court sits.156 Erie clarified,157 and subsequent cases have
confirmed,158 that choice of law rules are substantive in nature. It
follows that the same concerns about state court litigation are
mirrored in federal court litigation premised on diversity.159 When
a party pursues litigation in state or federal court over a security
agreement that is silent regarding choice of law, and when the
tribal government with jurisdiction over the property at issue has
adopted the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Act, that party risks
that the forum may use the relevant choice of law rules to either
apply the Model Act or U.C.C. Article 9. In other words, whether a
state or federal court would apply tribal law might be decided by a
state’s choice of law rules. Because much of Indian law exists so the
federal government can protect tribes from states, it would be
preferable for the parties to agree to both a choice of law and a
choice of forum clause in the security agreement properly
specifying tribal courts and tribal law.
III.

THE MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTION ACT: THE
NEED FOR A PRESUMPTION AGAINST PERFECTING A
SECURITY INTEREST IN TRIBAL CULTURAL PROPERTY

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL)160 was created over 100 years ago to
156 Id. at 79 (“The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether
called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State
existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in
England or anywhere else . . . ‘the authority and only authority is the State, and if that
be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature or of its
Supreme Court] should utter the last word.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1841))).
157 Id. In Erie, the Supreme Court instructed federal courts in New York to
apply New York’s choice of law rules to determine which substantive law would govern
the dispute. At the time, New York’s choice of law rules for torts required the
application of the law of the place of the injury. Because Tompkins was injured in
western Pennsylvania, it was Pennsylvania substantive law that governed. Thus, even
while Tompkins would have had a claim for negligence against the railroad under the
substantive laws of New York, the New York federal court was obligated to apply
Pennsylvania substantive law.
158 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (upholding
and reasserting Erie’s key principles: “discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws” (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 468 (1965))).
159 The headnote to Erie states: “A federal court exercising jurisdiction over
such a case on the ground of diversity of citizenship, is not free to treat this question as
one of so-called ‘general law,’ but must apply the state law as declared by the highest
state court.” 304 U.S. at 64.
160 For information on the creation, organization, structure, and purpose of
the NCCUSL, see About Us, NCCUSL, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?
title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
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address issues unique to a federal system of government and
specifically unique to the United States.161 Because the United
States government is by Constitutional dictate a government of
limited and enumerated powers,162 there exist issues of national
significance where having a single standard law in all jurisdictions
would greatly benefit both law and commerce but where the
federal government is unable to act.163 To fill this gap, the
NCCUSL was created to propose standard laws that each state
could independently enact, thus achieving legal uniformity within
the American federalist system.164
Tribal governments complicate this model.165 Because
they are independent sovereigns,166 most state laws and
regulations have no legal force inside the boundaries of the
reservation (or more technically in “Indian Country”). The 567
federally recognized tribes167 maintain governments that enact
161 Truman Carter & Fred H. Miller, Uniform Laws and Tribal Legislation;
One Tribe’s Perspective, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89, 89 (2001-2002).
162 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
163 Carter & Miller, supra note 161, at 89 (“The federal Constitution reserves
to the states ‘powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states.’ Because of this limitation, nearly all private law—
contracts, negotiable instruments, business organizations, marriage and divorce, for
example—and most areas of criminal law, are left for definition and regulation by the
legislatures and courts of the several states.” (quoting the Tenth Amendment)).
164 Id. (“NCCUSL is an organization peculiar to the federal system of
government, and is unique in American law. ‘American law’ of course actually consists
of fifty separate, and potentially differing, bodies of state law, co-existing with, and
overlaid by, federal law.”).
165 Id. at 95-96 (“As a general rule, state civil laws do not apply to transactions
arising in Indian country to which Indian tribes, tribal entities or tribal members are
parties, except to the extent authorized by Congress. The result as a general starting
point is that a tribe has the sovereign power to enact and enforce civil laws regulating
the conduct of their members and of non-Indians who come upon tribal land. This
authority includes the power to enforce contracts, even though entered into outside
reservation boundaries, and even off-reservation non-Indian land may qualify as a
‘dependent Indian community and thus part of Indian Country.’”).
166 See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515, slip op. at 4-5 (U.S. May
27, 2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-515_jq2i.pdf; see
also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (“Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”).
167 This article takes no position on the independent sovereignty of tribes that
are recognized by the respective state in which the tribe owns real property or
maintains a recognized government. The situation of state-recognized tribes is unique
and the authority of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted by each of the 50 states
may or may not be binding upon each state-recognized tribe depending on their own
arrangement of sovereignty that comes with state recognition. For a general discussion
of the different status of state-recognized tribes, see Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein,
Federalism and the State Recognition of Native American Tribes: A Survey of StateRecognized Tribes and State Recognition Processes Across the United States, 48 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 79 (2008).
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their own legislation, which may or may not be identical, or even
similar, to the otherwise uniform laws proposed by the NCCUSL
and enacted by the states. This creates the difficult situation
where a lawyer, assuming that the uniform law applies
everywhere in the United States, advises a client regarding a
transaction involving Indian Country, only to later discover to
the detriment of both the lawyer and the client, that the law is
different on the reservation.
The Model Tribal Secured Transaction Act is NCCUSL’s
proposed solution for how secured transactions can work differently
in Indian Country than in the ordinary state system.168 It succeeds
in striking a balance between two competing interests: consistency
with the U.C.C. and the preservation of tribal sovereignty. The
MTA must be close enough to U.C.C. Article 9 regarding secured
transactions that banks and other lending institutions, businesses,
and financial agents will find it comfortable to work with and
use,169 thus increasing the amount of leverage and financial
activity on the reservation.170 While at the same time, the MTA
must also preserve tribal sovereignty and enact rules that not
only accord with the customs, traditions, and legal histories of the
diverse 567 federally recognized tribes,171 but also actively
promote uniformity among the prospective adopters.172
See Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act, supra note 11.
The drafters of the Model Act identified that if the Model Tribal Act
differed in too many substantive ways from the Uniform Commercial Code, banks
would be hesitant to use the act or conduct business in Indian Country due to the
difference in law that would apply to their commercial transactions. Accordingly, the
drafters followed the same structure and format of U.C.C. Art. 9 when drafting the
Model Tribal Act, and wrote an explanatory guide “to assist non-tribal lenders and
businesses in understanding the similarities and differences between the Act and
corresponding provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.” NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 9, at 11.
170 For a brief discussion of how the U.C.C. has helped streamline commercial
transactions, see generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform
Commercial Code Annual Survey 38 BUS. LAW. 1107 (1983); see also Gidon Gottlieb,
Relationalism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 592 (1983)
(“The interpretation of such collective juridical acts involves considerations that are
primarily relational, thus permitting the groups regulated by the instrument to
develop their relationship with a view to their shared purposes.”).
171 Just like the Uniform Commercial Code, the Tribal Article 9 must try to
balance the interests of different regions and cultures across the United States. Indian
Country exists from Alaska to Maine, from Minnesota to Florida, in more than half of
the 50 states. For a complete list of federally recognized tribes eligible to adopt the
uniform act, see Indian Entities Recognized, supra note 29.
172 The Uniform Commercial Code is clear that among its primary purposes is
to streamline commercial practice through uniform action. See U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (“The
[Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies, which are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the
law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and (3) to
168
169
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Understandably, this creates an unenviable and Herculean
challenge. In recognition of this, the Model Tribal Act advises tribes
to think carefully about the choices they make when adopting the
language of the act. The implementation guide accompanying the
act reiterates this point: “The Act is intended to serve as a
“template” or model law for tribes. A Tribe should carefully
consider each provision of the Act, and modify or amend
provisions as necessary to accommodate its specific business, legal
and cultural environments.”173 Mindful of this language, this article
encourages tribes to explicitly include an exception for tribal
cultural property. More forcefully, the article also encourages the
drafters of the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act and
specifically the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws to consider amending even the proposed model act to
include a clear exemption for tribal cultural property. Effectively,
this would make an exception for tribal cultural property an optout instead of an opt-in and would accordingly better protect
tribal cultural property from accidental oversight or omission.
A.

The Model Act as Currently Written Risks the Loss of
Invaluable Cultural Property

The very nature of secured transactions means that the
MTA, as written, risks the loss of invaluable cultural property.
The MTA defines most of its key terms in section 9-106 and
provides a list of transactions not subject to the MTA in section 9111.174 Neither section discusses cultural property. Because
cultural property might be real or moveable, tangible or intangible,
no part of the model unequivocally speaks to its appropriateness
for use in a secured transaction. This presents a problem, as a
tribe’s cultural property—often key to identity, collective memory,
religious practice, and history—is among the most valuable forms
of property any tribe owns.
Without an exclusion for cultural property, the tribal
government, a tribal corporation, or an individual tribal member
with the right to sell the property may use it in order to secure a
loan or for other valuable consideration. By formalizing the
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”). The Model Tribal Secured
Transaction Act echoes this purpose in § 9-103: “This [act] must be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are the promotion
of economic development and the continued expansion of commercial practices
involving this [Tribe] [Nation].”
173 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 16.
174 MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 9-106, 9-111 (2005).
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agreement using the cultural property as collateral, the owner of
the cultural property is making a promise that if he or she fails to
comply with the terms of the security agreement, the lender can
take ownership of the cultural property in partial or full
consideration for the failure of the debtor to repay on schedule.
Whatever benefit the loan may bring to the tribe, tribal
corporation, or individual tribal member, the potential loss of the
cultural property ought to be considered. Each tribe is capable of
making its own determination, but the decision to permit cultural
property to be included among the classes of property eligible for a
security interest should be taken only after a consultation with
the entire tribal membership175 to consider the potential
implications of such a policy.176
Not all cultural property is put at risk under the MTA as
written. Even if the MTA is not rewritten to specifically exclude
tribal cultural property, after the act has been adopted, some
cultural property will be inappropriate as collateral in a secured
transaction.177 For example, the MTA recognizes that if property
is not alienable—that is, if the owner of the property doesn’t have
the right to sell, gift, or otherwise dispose of the property—the act
is inapplicable.178 This protects some cultural artifacts. For
example, under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act179 it is
illegal for non-Indians to buy, sell, or possess either the feathers
themselves or artifacts made with the feathers from bald and
golden eagles. Accordingly, such cultural items cannot qualify as
property in which a security interest may be vested for a nonSee infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
177 For an example of a limit on the vesting of a security interest in some real
property see supra note 58. Discussing the Non-Intercourse Act and its restrictions on
the ability of a tribe to transfer the title to some lands, largely located on Indian
reservations, that are held in trust by the United States on behalf of Indian tribes. For
a discussion on a limit imposed by Congressional statute on certain forms of tangible
personal property see The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, infra note 179.
178 MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-104 (“This [act] does not
apply to any property interest that is subject to federal restrictions regarding sale,
transfer, or encumbrance.”).
179 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2012). The act provides both criminal and civil penalties for:
175

176

[W]hoever, within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, without being permitted to do so as [hereinafter] provided [ ], shall
knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the consequences of his act take,
possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport,
export or import, at any time or in any manner any bald eagle commonly
known as the American eagle or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part,
nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or
regulation issued pursuant to this [Act], shall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
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Indian. The changes proposed here would prevent a tribal or
individual member from vesting in such items a security interest
even when the party extending the financing would qualify for
ownership (i.e. was an Indian). There are several defenses for
such a limitation including a concern that richer tribes could seek
to accumulate or expropriate the cultural property of poorer ones.
In deference to tribal sovereignty, a tribal government could
always opt to permit using cultural property as security between
its own members, but at the risk of starting down a rather
slippery slope. Accordingly, a bright-line rule is preferable.
Out of an abundance of caution, and because most tribal
cultural property is not protected like eagle feathers are
protected, the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act should be
changed to explicitly exclude such property from among the types
of property subject to a security interest. The implementation
guide should thus be revised to alert tribes to this change, and give
them the option of amending the model act to allow a security
interest to be perfected in cultural property. This arrangement has
the benefit of protecting more tribal cultural property while not
infringing upon a tribe’s sovereignty. Instead, it asks the tribe to
make a conscious choice as to whether it wants to expand the
property against which a security interest may be perfected with
the knowledge that the consequences of doing so include the loss
of tribal cultural property.
Tribal members, lawyers, and leaders should think
critically about the classes of property they want to be subject to a
security interest, and adopt or amend the act accordingly. This
implicitly recognizes that there are thus two different sets of tribal
populations that need to take slightly varied approaches to
adopting the exclusion of tribal cultural property: tribes that have
already adopted the MTA without the exclusion and tribes that
are considering its adoption. Regardless of the approach,
advocates seeking the exclusion of tribal property in the MTA will
find the original drafters of the Model Act are not opposed to the
change, and may even tacitly support it.180

180 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 19.
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Excluding Tribal Cultural Property from the Classes of
Property in which a Security Interest May be Properly
Vested is Consistent with the Intent Behind the Model Act

Creating a default rule is not contrary to the principles
expressed in the Model Act. In fact, in its Implementation
Guide, the drafters even explicitly suggest that tribes take
action to protect certain kinds of tribal property based upon
tribal custom and tradition:
Example:
Tribe has a custom that prohibits the transference of certain
religious artifacts or sacred objects for monetary or business
purposes. In such a case, the Tribe should consider adding a
provision to the Act that prohibits the creation of a security interest
in those types of religious artifacts or sacred items.

Example:
Tribe upholds the custom of give-aways on certain important events
in which Tribal members give away items of personal property. If
property that might be given away is made collateral subject to a
security interest, the security agreement should provide that the
donees take the property free of the security interests and, if
necessary, afford some other type of protection for the secured party
for the loss of the collateral.181

Neither the implementation guide nor the act itself
provide any insight as to why the drafters decided to omit cultural
property from among the Excluded Transactions spelled out in
§ 9-111. However, the implementation guide cautions tribes that
certain parts of the act might unintentionally conflict with a
tribe’s culture or traditions.182
Since the drafters clearly contemplated the role tribal
property might play in a secured transaction, the most likely
explanation for the omission of cultural property from the Act
itself is that the fewer deviations the Act has from the Uniform
Commercial Code, the more likely it is to be accepted by nontribal parties. This concern has merit: if the MTA is perceived to
be too different in form or function from the UCC, critical parties
including banks and other lenders who make secured loans and
Id.
Id. (“The Committee recommends that in adopting, interpreting and
applying the Act, due consideration be given to those customs and traditions. Where
and to the extent a provision in the Act conflicts or is inconsistent with a tribal custom
or tradition, an enacting Tribe should consider whether the custom or tradition will
take precedence over conflicting rights and priorities established by the Act.”).
181
182
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therefore are critically important to the MTA’s ability to drive
economic growth and development in Indian Country, may insist
on the use of state law. Such insistence would indeed undermine
the MTA by making it irrelevant.
Cognizant of these concerns, this Article does not lightly
suggest a change in the MTA text. In fact, it limits itself to a
single textual change that would exclude a small number of
transactions with major importance to the tribes themselves. The
drafting committee itself contemplated that tribes might want to
exclude cultural property.183 In order to protect such important
possessions, the default rule ought to be that cultural property is
excluded, and tribes during implementation can have a tribalwide discussion among the membership as to whether there are
good reasons for risking the loss of cultural property.
IV.

OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION: A DEMOCRATIC
EXERCISE

With this article I do not presume to know that vesting a
security interest in cultural property subject to a valid security
agreement is always inappropriate. Certainly, the debtor in the
secured transaction will either obtain complete ownership of, or
retain ownership of the property against which a security
interested is vested if the debtor complies with the terms of the
agreement and satisfactorily completes the schedule of
payments.184 While the explanation in Part III provides a
reasonable basis for tribes to adopt a default rule excluding
cultural or religious property from the classes of property in which
it is proper to vest a security interest, each tribe must decide for
itself whether it wants to delimit any class of property under the
MTA, considering its own tradition, needs, community
expectations, history, and identity.185
Id.
Upon completing the repayment schedule, the security interest that was
perfected against the property is removed. As the lender has been repaid according to
the terms of the agreement, the lender no longer has a valid claim to the title which
was secured as collateral in order to facilitate the original security agreement.
185 The only persons who ultimately should decide the action a tribe ought to
take are members of the tribe itself. Legal scholarship in the area of Indian law should
focus on providing ideas and guidance, suggestions and justifications for the actions
taken by tribal governments and tribal members. This article intends to add to that
discussion and add concerns that tribes should think critically about before taking
action, but nothing herein is intended to prevent a tribe which thoroughly considers the
consequences from allowing the perfection of a security interest in tribal cultural
property. For a discussion of the role of legal scholarship in Indian lawmaking, see
generally Symposium Materials Presented at the University of California at Berkeley
183
184
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With that deference to the tribe in mind,186 this section
argues that if a tribal government does not want to exempt
cultural or religious property from the class of property in which
it is proper to vest a security interest, then the tribal government
should do so only with the express consent of a majority of its
membership determined by a formal vote. This should not be
difficult and presents no legal problems.187 It is common to
survey opinion in Indian Country, as tribes regularly conduct
surveys of their membership through a variety of forms including
town hall meetings and tribal-wide elections.188 With very small
tribes, it may be possible to meet this democratic requirement by
resorting to a town hall or other similar tribal event where all
enrolled members are eligible to speak and decisions are made by
either the mutual consent of the membership or a vote with the
majority of the members affirming.189 Alternatively, larger tribes
would need to submit the question regarding the proper role of
cultural or religious property as security against a loan to the
broader membership during a tribal election.190 In lieu of a
formal election, some other binding consultation process of the
membership would be proper.191
Law School on Sept. 27-28, 2012: Conference Transcript: Heeding Frickey’s Call: Doing
Justice in Indian Country, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 347 (2012-2013).
186 See id.
187 Tribal referendums or other democratic surveys of tribal membership,
whether binding or merely advisory, are a common tool of building governmental
legitimacy in Indian Country. Raymond Cross, Development’s Victim or its Beneficiary?:
The Impact of Oil and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 87
N.D. L. REV. 535, 564 n.107 (2011) (citing CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE
RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 280-81 (2005)). For a specific example of tribal
referendums to permit or authorize business activity undertaken with or on behalf of
the tribe, see City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc., No. 08–CV–3966
(CBA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76306, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) (citing to the
affidavit of Professor John A. Strong who explained “that traditional law was codified
into ‘a system of regulation and community participation’ including licensing
procedures and the requirement of Tribal referendum to authorize business activity.”).
188 For a discussion of the different forms tribal governments, see MELISSA L.
TATUM ET AL., STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIVE NATIONS (2014);
see also SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS (1989).
189 For an extreme example, the Augustine Band of Cahuilla Indians at one
time had only a single surviving member and even today membership is comprised
of children from a single family. AUGUSTINE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS,
http://www.augustinetribe.org/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). Similarly, many of the more
than 200 federally recognized tribes in Alaska are small, consisting of several families
or bands. For these groups, consultation may not require a formal election, but instead
might be premised upon a well-informed dialogue among all enrolled adult members.
190 See TATUM ET AL., supra note 188.
191 With 567 federally recognized tribes, it is impossible to discuss here the
myriad of possibilities that exists for consulting with a tribe’s membership. As most
tribes regularly hold elections, and tribes with Constitutions under the IRA already
have a process in place not only for the election of officers but a means to amend their
tribal Constitutions, the process of consultation is neither onerous nor novel. However,
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The benefits of using the electoral process to adopt or
reject exceptions to the MTA are twofold. First, by virtue of a vote,
there would be a learning and debating process about secured
transactions more generally, which will not only create a better
informed electorate but also ensure that the language chosen in
the tribal adoption of the MTA reflects the community’s
understanding of what property is and what it should be used for.
Second, by essentially requiring an opt in instead of an opt out, the
default rule is more in line with federal policy on the protection of
sacred objects, funerary remains, dreams, names, and stories.192
V.

NATIVE STORIES, NATIVE PLACES, AND NATIVE PEOPLE

It is vitally important that tribes consider the potential
implications of permitting a security interest to be perfected in
cultural property. While there may be economic benefits of
immediate benefit and concern to the tribe, the risk of the loss of
the property should not be understated. This section will only
briefly describe the possible loss of cultural property of invaluable
importance to a tribe’s sense of place, identity, culture, history,
and religion. It is because of these risks that the sections above
argue forcefully that the default rule in the Model Tribal Secured
Transactions Act ought to exclude cultural property. However,
recognizing that tribes are sovereign entities,193 each has a right
to permit the perfection of a security interest in cultural property,
provided they are fully informed about the potential consequences.
The scope of cultural property for any given tribe is
defined by the tribe itself194 and may far exceed conventional
notions of what constitutes property195 or even the definition of
for tribes seeking to adopt the MTA and allow cultural property to be used as security
against a loan or other consideration, any form of binding consultation that both
informs the membership of the consequences of the rules and permits them to
participate in the decision making process should meet this criteria.
192 See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE (2003); see also
MELISSA L. TATUM & JILL KAPPUS SHAW, LAW, CULTURE & ENVIRONMENT (2014).
193 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515, slip op. at 4-5 (U.S. May
27, 2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-515_jq2i.pdf.
194 Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
291, 303 (1999) (“[C]ultural heritage is defined as an individual or group creation of
either a tangible or intangible good which, by virtue of the creation process, customary
use, historical event, or simply geographic proximity, becomes an important expression
of human or cultural life.”).
195 Id. at 303 (examples of tribal property may include “songs, dances, stories,
remedies, textile designs, sacred objects, drawings, works of art, sculpture and
architectural structures.”); see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at
§ 20.01[1] (noting that cultural property may include funerary objects, masks, totem
poles, or even such amorphous rights as access to a sacred site).
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property under international law.196 Maintaining an ownership
interest in this property is often vital to protecting and preserving
a tribe’s identity as a people, including their way of life and their
customs and traditions.197 Professor Tsosie has perhaps gone
furthest in documenting, discussing, and articulating the
importance of cultural property to tribes, including: the benefits
that protection, preservation, and display of tribal culture can
have on a tribe’s identity;198 the importance of creating a broader
human rights framework to protect tribal cultural property;199 and

196 Cultural
property protected under international law may include
monuments of architecture, art or history, archeological sites, buildings or structures of
historic or artistic interest, as well as scientific or important collections of books or
archives or of reproductions of such property. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0013/001333/133378mo.pdf.
197 Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural
Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 300 (2002) (“Cultural
resources, both tangible and intangible, are of critical importance to Native peoples,
because Native culture is essential to the survival of Indian Nations as distinctive
cultural and political groups.”).
198 Rebecca Tsosie, Native Nations and Museums, supra note 12 (extensively
discussing the role cultural property plays in tribal identity and the difficulty tribes
have in protecting and reasserting rights to cultural property). “However, is a Renoir
painting stolen from the home of a wealthy collector in the same category as a sacred
mask or medicine bundle ‘plundered’ from the Native American caretaker? Is this the
acquisition of stolen property or is it ‘anthropology?’” Id. at 9; see also Rebecca Tsosie,
Introduction: Symposium on Cultural Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2002) (generally
sharing the perspectives of native peoples on the link between control of culture and a
self-awareness or empowerment that comes with being able to preserve and direct
cultural development among traditional communities).
199 Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of “Culturally Unidentifiable”
Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights Framework, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 818
(2012). For example, without a clearly established group identity in part created
through reference to cultural property, it becomes impossible for tribes to continue to
reassert their rights under NAGPRA:

If the group lacks identity as a “federally recognized Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization,” the group does not have a legal right to repatriation,
although the group may obtain affiliated ancestral remains as a “moral”
accommodation, assuming that a legitimate claimant tribe can be found to
make the claim on its behalf and assuming that the museum or agency cares
to honor the request.
Id; see also Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: Science, Ethics,
and Human Rights, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1133 (2012) (discussing the unique difficulty
faced by tribes to achieve “justice” and protect “identity” through a protection of
cultural property). “Hermeneutical injustice is what occurs with many Native
American claims to protect aspects of their cultural identity from harms that are not
recognized standard categories of law. In particular, there is currently not a recognized
category within American law to redress cultural harm.” Id. at 1158.
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the danger that losing control over some forms of property can
have on individual tribal members and greater tribal identity.200
One of Tsosie’s conclusions is that ownership and
preservation of tribal property and cultural resources strengthens
identity and helps each tribe tell its own unique story.201 Professor
Melissa Tatum adds that cultural resources help tribes tell stories
of differentiation and thereby help secure a unique identity.202
Together, Professors Tsosie and Tatum have identified a series of
risks to tribal identity, and ultimately even tribal existence, that
are premised on a tribe’s ability to successfully preserve tribal
culture. Essentially, their work centers on the premise that
without the preservation and celebration of an identity that
makes each tribe unique, several dangers exist that threaten the
core of tribal identity. First, all Indian tribes might begin to be
grouped together and dealt with as one homogenous and
identifiable group as opposed to a celebration of the cultural
richness that makes each tribe unique.203 Second, the homogenous
group of “Indians” then begins to get absorbed or assimilated into
the broader group of “Americans,” altogether erasing Indian
identity.204 This process would not be immediate, but would have to
evolve over centuries, not unlike our existing Indian law policy.205
200 Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American
Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 396 (2007)
(discussing the link between genetics, biology, genomic research, culture, and identity).
201 Tsosie, NAGPRA, supra note 199, at 814 (“[T]he construction of legal rights
has a positive effect for those who are included as rights-holders, and, concomitantly, it
has a negative effect for those who are excluded from that status. To the extent that a
particular Native American ‘identity’ is necessary to achieve protection for the right to
repatriation, this is obviously critically important to the ability of Native peoples to
protect their cultural interests. The statutory terminology of what can be ‘culturally
affiliated’ and to whom, is critically important, as is the corollary terminology of what
is ‘culturally unidentifiable.’”).
202 Tatum, supra note 12, at 383-87 (2000) (discussing how “sweeping
generalizations” about groups can impact how those groups are viewed by others and
specifically how a tribe’s ability to differentiate itself is necessary to avoid all
“Indians” from being grouped together in legal, ethnographic, archeological, and
anthropological discussions).
203 Id.
204 Tsosie, NAGPRA, supra note 199, at 814.
205 Professor Robert Williams stands out among American Indian legal
scholars for his careful analysis of the ebb and flow of American Indian policy from
European “discovery” of the “new world” through 21st century jurisprudence. His
scholarship traces the jurisprudence and various eras of federal policies involving
Indians including conquest, termination, and assimilation. For an excellent discussion
of this evolution, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA
(2005); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy:
Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of
Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 51 (1991).
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However, the strongest bulwark against homogeneity and
assimilation is the preservation of unique tribal identities.
It is against this backdrop that the importance of
preserving ownership rights in cultural property is set. By
definition, allowing a security interest to be vested in tribal
cultural property is rolling the dice on the tribe’s ability to
maintain ownership and control over the story of its identity.206
Each security agreement using tribal cultural property risks
losing that property207 and diminishing the pool of tribal cultural
resources.208 Such a diminution directly contradicts federal209 and
international210 policy regarding the protection and preservation
of tribal cultural property and artifacts. Such potential losses,
206 See Tatum, Group Identity, supra note 12; Tsosie, Reclaiming Native
Stories, supra note 197, at 300.
207 If a security interest has been perfected in a piece of cultural property and
the debtor defaults on their obligations under a security agreement, then the lender
has the ability to transfer ownership of the property in which the security interest has
been perfected in consideration for the obligations under the security agreement.
Accordingly, if a tribe, tribal member, or other tribal entity were to use tribal cultural
property as the collateral upon which a security agreement is based with a non-Indian
or non-tribal entity and the tribe/member/tribal entity were to subsequently default,
the cultural property would no longer retain Indian ownership. For a brief discussion of
that process, see Richard L. Barnes, Distinguishing Sales and Leases: A Primer on the
Scope and Purpose of UCC Article 2A, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1995) (“How we
view or characterize our commercial transactions depends largely on the purpose we
are pursuing . . . . The right to repossess exists if there was a secured transaction and a
default.”(citing U.C.C. § 9-503 (1990))).
208 The amount of cultural property is finite, and property with a historical
basis can only ever be depleted from among known stocks. Accordingly, each loss of a
cultural property risks a devastating effect and each return of cultural property to
tribal ownership is to be celebrated. For a general discussion of this principle couched
in a discussion of The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, see
Tsosie, NAGPRA, supra note 199.
209 For an example of a statutory right to the protection of cultural property,
see the Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa-470mm (2012);
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2011); 25
U.S.C. §§ 3001-13; and the Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 305305e. For an executive order directing federal agencies to protect and accommodate
tribal cultural property, see Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (1996). For a
discussion of tribal property ownership, see Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and
Property, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 1 (1991). For a discussion of the benefits and potential
pitfalls of federal legal protection to tribal intangible property, see Tsosie, Reclaiming
Native Stories, supra note 197, at 347-58.
210 See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 3, G.A. Res.
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); Convention, supra note 196. For a
discussion of the international law regarding tribal property, see Kristen A. Carpenter,
Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1025
(2009) (“This body of cultural property law is unique because it traverses not only the
boundaries between properties—real, personal, and intellectual—but also the
boundaries between international, domestic, and tribal law. Indeed, on September 13,
2007, after twenty-five years of negotiation, the United Nations adopted the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which contains numerous provisions
explicitly recognizing the collective property rights of indigenous peoples to both
tangible and intangible resources.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
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repeated again and again over time, may have the cumulative
effect of an early 20th century anthropologist’s raid on a sacred
site,211 and could result in the loss of cultural property which
forms the linchpin of tribal identity.212
In an effort to avoid the slippery slope and ensure that the
cultural property slowly being clawed back and preserved in the
21st century remains under the thoughtful control of individual
Indians and Indian tribal governments,213 this article urges tribes
that adopt the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Act to include
an explicit protection for cultural property. Additionally, it urges
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to revise the MTA to adopt a bright-line protection for tribal
cultural property.214 Such a solution would by no means prevent a
tribe from exercising its sovereign right to remove such a
restriction, but it would ensure that the baseline for protection
errs on the side of protecting tribal cultural property.215
VI.

CONCLUSION: START BY PROTECTING OURSELVES

Indian Country is just different. The title to property is
more complicated, the issue of sovereignty is more nuanced, and
the choice of law and choice of forum questions are more complex.
Because the traditional U.C.C. Article 9 governing secured
transactions is not designed to contemplate the existence of tribal
sovereigns, the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act was born.
This article has taken the position that the MTA is,
overall, an excellent document. It fills a demonstrated niche in
tribal codes and will promote economic growth by clarifying the
process and rules for investing in Indian Country via secured
transactions. But tribes need to be cautious when deciding to
211 For an excellent discussion of the effect upon tribes of the loss of cultural
property, see Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 35 (1992).
212 For a discussion of the role cultural property plays in creating tribal
identity, see Tatum, supra note 12 and Tsosie, supra note 198.
213 This article is limited to the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Act and
accordingly governs only property subject to the authority and control of tribal
governments. For a discussion of how broad tribal authority might extend, see Grant
Christensen, Creating Bright-Line Rules for Tribal Court Jurisdiction over NonIndians: The Case of Trespass to Real Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527 (2010-2011);
see also Fletcher, Unifying Theory, supra note 13.
214 For a thorough discussion of the need for a presumption against the
inclusion of tribal cultural property as a security interest in a security agreement and
the corresponding encouraging to tribes to adopt such a presumption in the absence of
change to the MTA, see supra Part III.
215 Id.
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implement the MTA, particularly when they decide what classes of
property ought to be eligible to vest within them a security interest.
The drafters of the Model Act clearly identified many of the issues
that might arise should cultural property be ultimately subject to a
security agreement and the debtor defaults on their obligations.
Unfortunately, the drafters allowed attempts at uniformity with
the existing Uniform Commercial Code, a preference not to limit
the types or kinds of property subject to a security agreement, and
perhaps an under appreciation of the importance of cultural
property to tribal identity to culminate in an opt in instead of an
opt out default rule for protecting tribal cultural property.
The danger to tribes is not as well understood as it needs
to be. If a tribe allows a historical, cultural, or religious artifact to
be used as collateral in order to obtain a loan via a secured
transaction, the tribe is taking a risk that they will be unable to
pay their obligations and lose the right to that property. For many
tribes, the consequences of losing that cultural property amount
to a loss of identity. Accordingly, it follows that the MTA should
be reconsidered to include, as a general rule, that property related
to the history, culture, or identity of the tribe is not eligible to vest
a security interest.
However, in light of the diversity of Indian Country, while
all tribes should be encouraged to adopt this general proposition,
no tribe is required to prohibit the vesting of a security interest in
these kinds of religious or cultural property. Instead, tribal leaders
who want to use identity or culturally indispensable property
should be able to do so, but only after the consequences of doing so
are explained to the entire membership of the tribe and a majority
of the eligible membership consent.
Uniform and predictable rules governing the process,
enforcement, and classes of property subject to a secured
transaction involving Indian Country will undoubtedly increase the
amount of economic development that occurs there. As investors,
creditors, lenders, banks, entrepreneurs and tribes become more
familiar with uniform rules for commercial relationships on
reservations and upheld by tribal courts—ever more capital will
flow through the open gates of the reservation. This opening up of
tribal economies will reap great dividends, but tribal councilors,
chairpersons, and business development directors need to take
proactive steps to ensure that this growth does not risk the loss of
the kinds of cultural property that help maintain the unique
identity of many tribal communities.

